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Notes
The Good Faith Exception as Applied to
Illegal Predicate Searches:
A Free Pass to Institutional Ignorance
ANDREW Z. LiPSON*

INTRODUCTION

In Herring v. United States, the Supreme Court recently held that
when an unlawful search is conducted by a police officer reasonably
relying on a police clerk's mistaken report that an individual has an
outstanding arrest warrant, the evidence obtained from the search is not
excludable at trial.' While many have heralded Herringas a massive blow
to the once robust exclusionary rule,' the case is unremarkable as it
conforms with the good faith exception jurisprudence that exclusion is
only justified when it will meaningfully deter future police misconduct.
Although Herring is the first occasion where the Court applied the good
faith exception to evidence obtained by an illegal search based on a
mistake made by a law enforcement employee, it did not address the
application of the exception to situations where it is the officer himself
who was responsible for the violation.
There is a split among the circuit courts of appeals about whether it
is appropriate to apply the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule
* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2009. I would like to
thank Professors Rory Little and Hadar Aviram for their input while writing this Note. I am indebted
to the editors of the Hastings Law Journalfor their insight and comments during the editorial process.
And finally, I would like to dedicate this Note to the late Cary Lacklen, former Public Defender in
Boulder County, Colorado. He introduced me to the fascinating practice of criminal defense, and
taught me the importance of safeguarding the rights of criminal defendants.
I. 129 S. Ct. 695. 698 (2009).
2. See, e.g., Editorial, The Fourth Amendment Diluted, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2009, at A28,
available at
http://www.nytimes.CoM2009/0I/i6/opinion/I6fri2.html?_r=i&scp=i&sq=%22The%
2oFourth%2oAmendment%2oDiluted%22&st=cse; Adam Liptak, Justices Step Closer to Repeal of
Evidence Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2o09, at AI, available at http:lwww.nytimes.eoml2oo9/oI/31/
washington/3 iscotus.html.
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to illegal searches resulting from police officer errors. Some circuits have
ruled that when a police officer violates an individual's Fourth
Amendment rights by conducting a search without articulable suspicion
or probable cause, the evidence obtained from that search is still
admissible if the police officer's own error was objectively reasonable.
These courts recognize that some searches, although illegal, are so close
to the line of validity that the officer's actions were still reasonable. Since
the exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of an individual's Fourth
Amendment rights is justified only when it would substantially deter
future similar misconduct, evidence should not be suppressed when the
officer's actions were reasonable. Other circuits have disagreed however,
finding that when a police officer is wholly responsible for misapplying
the law when conducting a search without the requisite articulable
suspicion or probable cause, the state is per se precluded from seeking
the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. These courts have
ruled that the exclusionary rule is specifically aimed at deterring police
misconduct, and when police officers are responsible for the violation of
the individual's Fourth Amendment rights, it is in these very situations
that the exclusionary rule has its most meaningful effect. There are
several circuit courts that have yet to address this issue, as well as the
Supreme Court.
This Note seeks to determine whether the exclusionary rule is
applicable to an illegal predicate search. An illegal predicate search is an
unlawful warrantless seizure that uncovers evidence that later serves as a
basis for an application for a search warrant.3 Although an unlawful
seizure by a police officer in violation of the Fourth Amendment
normally invokes the exclusionary rule, the good faith exception bars
suppression of evidence where the search and seizure were conducted in
good faith and were objectively reasonable.' The Supreme Court has
only applied the good faith exception when an officer has reasonably
relied on another individual's error rather than on his own.5 Illegal
predicate searches, however, typically involve an officer's reliance on
their own erroneous understanding of the lawfulness of a search and
seizure under the Fourth Amendment.' Therefore, in order to honor the
deterrent purposes of the exclusionary rule, and in order to deter
institutional ignorance of the lawfulness of search and seizure law of the
Fourth Amendment, courts must not extend the good faith exception to
cases where there has been an illegal predicate search. If courts fail to
3. Gretchan R. Diffendal, Note, Application of the Good-Faith Exception in Instances of a
Predicate Illegal Search: "Reasonable" Means Around the Exclusionary Rule, 68 ST. JoHN's L. REv.
217, 226 (1994).

4. See infra Part I.B.
5. See infra Part I.B.
6. See Diffendal, supra note 3.
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suppress illegally obtained evidence resulting from police errors when
conducting searches, they will institutionally memorialize law
enforcement's ignorance of the law, and our privacy secured by the
Fourth Amendment will be eroded.
In Part I of this Note, I will discuss the background of the
exclusionary rule and the good faith exception as defined by Supreme
Court jurisprudence and respected commentary. In Part II, I will set
forth the landscape of the split among the circuit courts in applying the
good faith exception to illegal predicate searches. And finally, in Part III,
I will argue that in order to comport with the purposes of the
exclusionary rule and the good faith exception, future courts addressing
this issue must suppress evidence obtained pursuant to warrants
substantially based on evidence obtained by an illegal predicate search.
I. THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE AND THE GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION
A brief account of the development of the exclusionary rule is
necessary to understand its purpose, and thus the reasoning behind its
various exceptions. Exclusion is not intended to remedy the
constitutional wrongs suffered by the accused, but rather it is a judicially
created mechanism to incentivize police officers to obey the law.
Accordingly, the Court crafted various exceptions where exclusion does
not effectively deter future police violations of the Fourth Amendment.
The good faith exception will be discussed in depth below.
A.

THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE

The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.7
To enforce the provisions of the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court
fashioned the exclusionary rule. The exclusionary rule provides that
evidence seized in violation of an individual's Fourth Amendment rights
cannot be used against him in his prosecution s Although the Supreme
Court incorporated the Fourth Amendment against the states via the
7. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

8. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) ("We therefore reach the conclusion that the
letters in question were taken from the house of the accused by an official of the United States acting
under color of office ... and that the court should have restored these letters to the accused.").
Individuals whose Fourth Amendment rights have been violated may also seek civil damages under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 597-98 (2oo6); Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed.
Narcotic Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (i7i). But see Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 707 (2009)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("The exclusionary rule ... is often the only remedy effective to redress a
Fourth Amendment violation." (citations omitted)).
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Fourteenth Amendment in Wolf v. Colorado,9 it was not until twelve

years later, in Mapp v. Ohio, that the states were required to implement
the exclusionary rule as well." This disjointed relationship between the
protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment and the application of
the exclusionary rule" underscores the disagreements within the
Supreme Court, and among courts around the country, as to when it is
appropriate to invoke the exclusionary rule.
The Supreme Court has explained that the exclusionary rule
operates as "a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth
Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a
personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved."' 2 Exclusion creates
a system of incentives for those who have violated an individual's Fourth
Amendment rights not to do so in the future.'3 Since the incorporation of
the exclusionary rule against the states in Mapp, however, the Court has
remained mindful of the dangers of overapplication, and wary of the
"substantial social costs"' 4 of "letting guilty and possibly dangerous
defendants go free."' 5 Despite this perpetual balancing act, the United
States stands almost alone in the application of a meaningful
exclusionary rule when an individual's rights are violated. 6
There is considerable debate about whether the exclusionary rule
effectively deters police misconduct. 7 Likewise, there is skepticism about
whether there is a substantial cost to society in granting such a powerful
remedy to violated constitutional rights.'8 These subjects are beyond the
scope of this Note. Despite Jeremy Bentham's caution that to "exclude

9. 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (949).
10. 367 U.S. 643,654-55 (1961).
ii. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 223 (1983) ("[Applying the exclusionary rule is] an issue
separate from the question whether the Fourth Amendment rights of the party seeking to invoke the
rule were violated by police conduct.").
12. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 0974).
13. See id. at 347-55.
14. Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 352-53 (1987).
15. Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695,701 (2009).
-6. See Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 343-44 (20o6) ("The exclusionary rule as we
know it is an entirely American legal creation. More than 40 years after the drafting of the [Vienna]
Convention, the automatic exclusionary rule applied in our courts is still 'universally rejected' by other
countries." (citations omitted)); see also Gordon Van Kessel, Adversary Excesses in the American
Criminal Trial, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 403, 451 (1992) ("We are not the only country to exclude
reliable evidence in order to further collateral objectives, yet the scope, complexity, and stringent
operation of our exclusionary rules suggests that no other country has so little regard for the accuracy
of its criminal trial results."); id. at 452-55 (citing various countries that do not exclude evidence in
various circumstances where it is well established under American law that to do so would be
unconstitutional and violative of an individual's fundamental rights).
57. For a more in-depth discussion of these issues, see Albert W. Alschuler, Studying the
Exclusionary Rule: An Empirical Classic, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1365, 1365-74 (2008).
18. See id. at 1375 (citing several studies that show that only a small fraction of prosecutions
prove unsuccessful as a result of the application of the exclusionary rule).
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evidence, you exclude justice,"' 9 the exclusionary rule remains the most
vital protection for the American populace against convictions based
upon illegal searches and seizures.
B.

THE GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE

Where the purposes of the exclusionary rule cease to be served by
suppressing evidence, the Supreme Court has recognized various
exceptions to its application. 0 One such exception, good faith, has been
expanded over the years to include various violations of an individual's
Fourth Amendment rights. In United States v. Leon, the Supreme Court
held that the exclusionary remedy is not to be applied where an officer
illegally obtains evidence relying on "a search warrant issued by a
detached and neutral magistrate but ultimately found to be unsupported
by probable cause. ' 2' ' In creating the good faith exception, the Court
explained that no appreciable deterrent effect on police misconduct
would be served by suppressing evidence seized in good faith by an
offending officer.22
The Court supported its finding of a good faith exception with five
observations. First, the exclusionary rule is meant to "deter police
misconduct rather than to punish the errors of judges and magistrates."23
Second, there is no evidence that magistrates ignore or attempt to
subvert the protections of the Fourth Amendment. 4 Third, there is no
reason to believe exclusion of "evidence seized pursuant to a warrant will
have a significant deterrent effect on the issuing judge or magistrate.""
Fourth, excluding evidence cannot deter reasonable police conduct
"unless it is to make [them] less willing to do [their] duty."26 And finally,
police officers are reasonable when relying on a magistrate's
determination of probable cause. 7

The Court emphasized "that the standard of reasonableness... is an
objective one" when determining whether a police officer acted in good
faith when conducting an illegal search.2" An inquiry into the subjective
intent of the officer at the time of the search is outside the province of
19. 5 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 1 (1827).
20. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 909 (1984) (good faith exception); Nix v.
Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 449-50 (1984) (inevitable discovery exception); Walder v. United States, 347
U.S. 62, 64-68 (1954) (impeachment exception); Nardone v. United States, 3o8 U.S. 338, 340-43 (1939)
(attenuated fruits exception); Silverthore Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 389-90 (i920)
(independent source exception).
21. 468 U.S. at 9oo.
22. Id. at 908.
23. Id. at 916.
24. Id.
25.

Id.

26. Id. at 920 (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,539-40 0976) (White, J., dissenting)).
27. Id. at 921.
28. Id. at 919 n.20.
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courts, and ultimately, an objective test "'retains the value of the
exclusionary rule as an incentive for the law enforcement profession as a
whole to conduct themselves in accord with the Fourth Amendment.' ' .9
This objective standard, however, requires that "officers have a
reasonable knowledge of what the law prohibits."3 In support of this
contention, the Court cited an article by Professor Jerold Israel, which
stated that "It]he key to the [exclusionary] rule's effectiveness as a
deterrent lies, I believe, in the impetus it has provided to police training
programs that make officers aware of the limits imposed by the fourth
amendment and emphasize the need to operate within those limits."'"
The same day Leon was decided, the Court applied the newly
crafted good faith exception to another case where a police officer relied
in good faith on a warrant that a magistrate judge assured him was not
defective.3" In Massachusetts v. Sheppard, a police officer submitted a
warrant application form to a magistrate judge.33 The officer sought the
warrant on a Sunday, the one day of the week that the local courthouse
was closed, and thus he was not able to obtain a basic search warrant
application.34 Instead, he submitted a form to the judge that was
specifically tailored to search for controlled substances, a type of search
that was outside the scope of his investigation.35 The warrant-issuing
judge assured the police officer that crossing out the words "controlled
substance" on the application form would render the application valid, a
determination that was later declared incorrect by the Massachusetts
courts. 6 As in Leon, the Court found that the police officer's reliance on
the warrant was in good faith and objectively reasonable, and therefore
ruled37that applying the exclusionary rule was not appropriate in such a
case.

Since Leon and Sheppard, the Supreme Court has extended the
good faith exception to three other situations where a police officer was
objectively reasonable in conducting a search. In Illinois v. Krull, the
Court admitted evidence obtained during an illegal search conducted by
a police officer pursuant to a state statute that was later declared
unconstitutional. As in Leon, the Court found that no appreciable
29. Id. (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 261 n.15 (198 3 ) (White, J., concurring in
judgment)).
30. Id. at 920 n.20 (citing United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 542 (I975)).
31. Id. (citing Jerold Israel, CriminalProcedure, the Burger Court, and the Legacy of the Warren
Court,75 MicH. L. REv. 1319, 1412 (I977)).

32. Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984).
33. Id. at 985.
34. Id.

35. Id.
36. Id. at 986-87.
37. Id. at 991.
38. 480 U.S. 340,340-41 (1986).
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deterrent effect could be attained by suppressing the evidence.3 9 It was
the state legislature that erred in passing an unconstitutional statute that
caused the Fourth Amendment violation rather than any mistake by the
police officer.' The Court was wary that exclusion of evidence would
encourage police officers to question the laws passed by the state
legislature, laws that they are compelled to execute in the performance of
their duties.4"
Subsequently, in Arizona v. Evans, the Court refused to apply the
exclusionary rule to evidence obtained after a police officer relied in
good faith on an error in the state's computer system, which erroneously
indicated that the defendant had an outstanding warrant for his arrest.
Refusing to suppress the evidence obtained from the illegal search, the
Court explained that "[i]f court employees were responsible for the
erroneous computer record, the exclusion of evidence at trial would not
sufficiently deter future errors so as to warrant such a severe sanction [as
exclusion]." '4 The Court reasoned that since court employees have no
vested interest in violating Fourth Amendment rights, exclusion in this
situation would not deter future police misconduct, the very conduct that
the exclusionary rule aims to deter."
Most recently, in Herring v. United States, the Court ruled that
evidence seized by an officer who relied on a police clerk's mistaken
report that the defendant had an outstanding warrant for his arrest was
admissible.45 The facts bear striking resemblance to those in Evans,
except that in Herring, the mistake was made by police personnel rather
than court employees. 6 Since these errors were not "routine or
widespread," were at most negligent, and exclusion would only have a
39. Id. at 349.
40. See id. at 349-53.
41. Id.
42. 514 U.S. 1,3-4 (1995).
43. Id. at 14.
44. Id. at 15-16.
45. 129 S.Ct. 695, 698 (2009).
46. Id. at 710 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The application of the good faith exception to the situation
presented in Herring, at least for two Justices, represented a crucial departure from its application in
Leon and its progeny. See id. ("The rationale for our decision [in Evans] was premised on a distinction
between judicial errors and police errors, and we gave several reasons for recognizing that
distinction."); see also 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 3 .5 (d) (4th ed. 2004) (noting that the outcome of Evans would change if the police had
been responsible for the error because the "rationale would seem inapplicable whenever the mistake
was instead attributable to the law enforcement agency"); id. (discussing Carterv. State, 305 A.2d 856,
86o (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1973), where the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland held that the fault of
the police department in general is imputed to an arresting officer when effectuating an arrest
pursuant to a false outstanding warrant). In People v. Ramirez, the California Supreme Court held that
"if we impute to the arresting officer the collective knowledge of law enforcement agencies for the
purpose of establishing probable cause, we must also charge him with knowledge of information
exonerating a suspect formerly wanted in connection with a crime." 668 P.2d 761, 764 (Cal. 1983).
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marginal deterrent impact on future mistakes, the Court ruled that the
large societal impact of evidence suppression could not be justified.' As
Herring represents the most recent interpretation of the scope of the
good faith exception, it will be quite influential in determining the
exception's application in a host of unaddressed situations, such as the
one contemplated by this Note.
In the five instances where the Supreme Court has applied the good
faith exception, a police officer relied in good faith on another actor in
determining whether or not to conduct a search. These situations, despite
Justice Brennan's dissent in Leon,' 8 highlight the primary purpose of the
exclusionary rule: deterring police misconduct rather than maintaining
judicial integrity and cross-institutional deterrence. Commenting on the
deterrent nature of the exclusionary rule, Professor Wayne LaFave has
recognized that "because Leon rests upon the notion that the
exclusionary rule is not implicated where there is no police misconduct to
deter, that case does 'not allow law enforcement authorities to rely on an
error of their own making."'49 LaFave, a well-respected scholar on the
Fourth Amendment, has noted that this concept was "carried to an
extreme" in the Supreme Court's decision in Groh v. Ramirez." In Groh,
a police officer prepared a warrant application with specific references to
the place to be searched and the items to be seized.' The officer also
completed the warrant form, but "failed to identify any of the items that
[he] intended to seize."52 The defendant sought a section 1983 remedy for
violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. 3 The Court stated that "'the
same standard of objective reasonableness that... applie[s] in the
context of a suppression hearing in Leon defines the qualified immunity
accorded an officer"' in a civil damages action." Ruling for the plaintiff,
the Court concluded that "because [the affiant] himself prepared the
invalid warrant, he may not argue that he reasonably relied on the
Magistrate's assurance that the warrant contained an adequate
description of the things to be seized and was therefore valid."55
The distinction between a police officer's good faith reliance on a
third party actor and a police officer's good faith reliance on his own
47. Herring,129 S.Ct. at 704.
48. 468 U.S. 897, 953 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[T]he chief deterrent function of the rule
is its tendency to promote institutional compliance with Fourth Amendment requirements on the part
of law enforcement agencies generally.").
49. 1 LAFAVE, supra note 46, § .3(f) (quoting Commonwealth v. Hecox, 619 N.E.2d 339, 342
(Mass. App. Ct. 1993)).
50. Id. at n.68 (citing 540 U.S. 55I (2004)).
5t. 540 U.S. at 554.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 555.
54. Id. at 565 n.8 (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344 (1986)).
55. Id. at 564 (emphasis added).
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understanding of the law is apparent from the Fourth Amendment
warrant requirement and the Supreme Court's jurisprudence. The Court
has interpreted the Fourth Amendment's probable cause and warrant
requirement to check police power by requiring judicial magistrates to
act as an intermediary between the individual and the state. The
Supreme Court has explained that the Fourth Amendment's "protection
consists in requiring that those inferences [of probable cause] be drawn
by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the
officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out
crime." 6 Underlying this principle is the notion that "[s]ecurity against
unlawful searches is more likely to be attained by resort to search
warrants than by reliance upon the caution and sagacity of petty officers
while acting under57' the excitement that attends the capture of persons
accused of crime.
The Supreme Court has yet to directly address the issue of whether
or not the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule should apply in
situations where the illegal police search was conducted in reliance on
the officer's own understanding of search and seizure law. Illegal
predicate searches often present this very situation and thus are analyzed
in the next Patt. Given the very technical and disputed applications of
the Fourth Amendment over the last sixty years, it is not surprising that
many police officers have difficulty in discerning the exact protections
afforded by the Amendment. This difficulty, however, does not absolve
police departments from effectively training police officers and apprising
them of the contours of our Fourth Amendment rights. Several articles
have been written on the subject of illegal predicate searches, however
none have specifically addressed the current circuit split and advocated
that the good faith exception must not be invoked when a police officer
relies in good faith on their own error with regards to search and seizure
law.,8 Now more than ever, this Note is particularly relevant as circuit
courts are weighing in on this particular issue. It is necessary that future
courts uniformly reject the application of the good faith exception to
56. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 1O, 4 (0948).
57. United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452,464 (932).

58. See, e.g., Thomas K. Clancy, Extending the Good Faith Exception to the Fourth Amendment's
Exclusionary Rule to Warrantless Seizures that Serve as a Basis for the Search Warrant, 32 Hous. L.

REV. 697 (1995) (arguing that magistrate judges should assume a more involved role in the searchwarrant-issuing process-extensively reviewing predicate police activity-which would justify
subsequent reliance on search warrants issued on the basis of an illegal search); Diffendal, supra note
3, at 234-39 (opining on the way in which the then-situated Supreme Court would rule on the
developing issue of illegal predicate searches based on individual Justice's prior decisions); Kenneth C.
Halcom, Note, Illegal Predicate Searches and the Good Faith Exception, 2oo7 U. ILL. L. REV. 467

(2007) (arguing that although the illegally obtained evidence should be dismissed from the warrant
application, courts should create a legal fiction that assumes that the warrant was issued anyway,
absent the illegally obtained evidence, and that courts should then review whether a police officer
could have, in good faith, reasonably relied on the warrant).
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situations where the Fourth Amendment violation results from mistakes
solely attributable to the searching officer. Naturally, the Supreme
Court's recent decision in Herring will influence future decisions in this
area.
II.

ILLEGAL PREDICATE SEARCHES: Two APPROACHES TO LEON

Federal courts around the country have taken direction from Leon
and its progeny and have developed different interpretations. These
different interpretations of the good faith exception have resulted in
disparate applications of its reach. Several circuits refuse to suppress
evidence where the illegal search was objectively reasonable, even if the
officer is solely responsible for the constitutional violation. Other courts,
however, have ruled that when the illegal search is the fault of the
officer, the state is per se precluded from invoking the good faith
exception. A break down of the various circuits that have had the
opportunity to rule on this issue and their rules highlights their respective
rationales.
A.

THE GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION EXTENDS TO POLICE OFFICERS' RELIANCE
ON THEIR OWN UNDERSTANDING OF THE LAW

r. The Sixth Circuit
In 2005, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the good faith
exception applies to situations where the police were solely responsible
for a Fourth Amendment violation. In United States v. McClain, a police
officer entered the defendant's house in violation of his Fourth
Amendment rights. 9 Officers responded to a call from a concerned
neighbor who saw a light on in an abandoned house." Arriving on the
scene, the officer observed the light, and saw that the door was slightly
ajar. 6' After waiting for backup, two officers conducted a protective
sweep of the house, which turned out to be empty. 6' During the
protective sweep, however, they observed equipment that suggested that
a marijuana growing operation was being set up.6' Based on this
information, a surveillance investigation was conducted. 64 With the
information obtained that night and during the surveillance investigation,
a search warrant was obtained and the premises were searched. The
postwarrant search led to the discovery of 348 marijuana plants. 66 The

59.
6o.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

444 F.3d 556, 564 (6th Cir. 2005).
Id. at 559.
Id.
Id. at 56o.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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district court found that the initial search of the residence violated the
defendant's rights under the Fourth Amendment, and granted
67
suppression of all subsequently obtained evidence.
The government appealed and the Sixth Circuit reversed. 68 Although
the police officer conducted an illegal predicate search, the evidence
obtained from the postwarrant search was not excludable because the
initial violation was "close enough to the line of validity," and therefore
no exclusion was justified. 69 Specifically the court stated, "we do not
believe that the officers were objectively unreasonable in suspecting that
criminal activity was occurring inside McClain's home, and we find no
evidence that the officers knew they were violating the Fourth
Amendment by performing a protective sweep of the home., 70 The Sixth
Circuit adopted this broad reading of the Leon exception despite a rather
persuasive concurring opinion by Chief Judge Boggs, who found that the
initial search was reasonable under the exigent circumstances exception
to the warrant requirement." The court could have overturned the lower
court's decision relying on Judge Boggs' exigent circumstances theory,
but chose not to. Perhaps the majority was trying to limit the expansion
of exigent circumstances doctrine, but more likely the court had been
looking for an opportunity to expand the good faith exception doctrine.
2.
The Eighth Circuit
The rule in McClain was adopted from a decision handed down by
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. White.72 In White,
the court interpreted the Leon exception to mean that "evidence seized
pursuant to a warrant, even if in fact obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment, is not subject to the exclusionary rule if an objectively
reasonable police officer could have believed the seizure valid."73 In
deciding not to suppress, the White court determined that the violation at
issue was "close enough to the line of validity to make the officers' belief
in the validity of the warrant objectively reasonable."74 In White, police
officers witnessed the defendant disembark from a plane at St. Louis'
Lambert International Airport. Observing the defendant (i) leave the
plane clutching his bag in his arms rather than hanging on his shoulder;
(2) look over his shoulder on three separate occasions while walking to
baggage claim; and (3) appear "agitated," officers approached him and

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at 561.
Id. at 559.
Id. at 566.
Id.
Id. at 569 (Boggs, C.J., concurring in judgment).
890 F.2d 1413 (8th Cir. 1989).
Id. at 1419.
Id.
Id. at 414.
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began to ask him questions. 76 Despite the fact that they did not have a
warrant, the police refused to allow the defendant to leave the airport
with his luggage upon learning that he had purchased his one-way ticket
from Los Angeles with cash.77 The White court found that the police
officers did not have the requisite articulable suspicion to detain the
defendant or his luggage, yet posited that "[t]he purchase of the ticket for
cash, plus the incremental effect of the other factors7'8present in this case,
pushes this case into the gray area created by Leon. F
This rule was subsequently applied by the Eighth Circuit in United
States v. Kiser.79 The facts in Kiser were similar to those in White; in Kiser,
the defendant was stopped by police officers in Chicago's O'Hare
Airport. s° After he disembarked a plane from Miami, police observed the
defendant walking down the concourse, anxiously stopping at two
different water fountains to look over his shoulder despite not drinking
any water.8 ' An investigation ensued at the car rental station, where it
became apparent that the defendant was using a credit card belonging to
a relative and that he had traveled under a fictitious name."2 Seeing that
the defendant was nervous, the officers asked to search the defendant's
bag, a request that was denied.' The officers then seized his luggage and
subjected it to a sniff test, which turned out positive, a fact later used to
obtain a search warrant to search the bag. " On appeal, the Eighth Circuit
once again held that although the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights
were violated, "the circumstances gave the officers an objectively
reasonable belief that they possessed•... articulable suspicion that would
make the search warrant valid," and therefore this "push[es] this case
into the gray area created by Leon."8
Likewise, in United States v. Fletcher, the Eighth Circuit found that
the good faith exception applied to police misconduct in another baggage
seizure at an airport.6 In Fletcher, police officers seized the defendant's
bag in Des Moines Airport.87 The police conducted the seizure based on
the following circumstances:
(i) Fletcher arrived from Phoenix, a drug source city; (2) he was first
off the plane (3) and proceeded directly to the restroom; (4) he was
76. Id. at 1414-15.

77. Id. at 1415.
78. Id. at 1419.
79. 948 F.2d 418 (8th Cir. '99').
8o. Id. at 42.
8i. Id. at422.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.

85. Id. (citing United States v. White, 89o F.2d 1413, 1419 (8th Cir. 1989)).
86. 91 F.3d 48, 51-52 (8th Cir. I996).
87. Id. at 49.
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connected to a white pick-up truck with supplemental gas tanks and
Arizona license plates; (5) he told the police he had a round trip ticket
when the officers believed he had a one way ticket purchased with
cash; (6) Fletcher withdrew his consent after initially agreeing to a
search; and (7) he was associated with a woman at a local address
where a narcotics complaint had been made.8'
The court of appeals agreed with the district court that the officers
lacked articulable suspicion that the defendant was engaged in illegal
activity, but did not grant suppression pursuant to Leon because the
"facts surrounding reasonable suspicion [were] close enough to the line
of validity."' The court further found that "[t]he purpose of the
exclusionary rule, deterrence of police misconduct, will not be served by
its application to this case. '
Underlying the rule in each of these three cases is the idea that
suppression of evidence seized illegally, yet close to the line of validity,
would not have an appreciable deterrent effect of future police conduct.
Essential to this argument is an assumption that there are illegal searches
that are objectively reasonable. Relying on this understanding, the
Eighth Circuit found that where the illegal search was so close to the
point at which the police conduct would have been legal, then exclusion
would do nothing to prevent further privacy abuses by law enforcement.
3. The Second Circuit
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has arguably adopted a rule
applying the good faith exception to illegal predicate searches.' The
Second Circuit briefly addressed this issue in United States v. Thomas
shortly after Leon was handed down by the Supreme Court.92 In Thomas,
police officers applied for a search warrant based on an informant's tip
that indicated (i) that the defendant was a narcotics dealer, (2) that the
defendant acted suspiciously the prior day when he was arrested, and (3)
a positive canine sniff.93 Although the court found that the canine sniff
violated the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights, the court denied
suppression because it found that "[t]here [was] nothing more the officer
could have or should have done under these circumstances to be sure his
search would be legal."' Judge Martin of the Sixth Circuit has argued,
however, that this case is different than the above-mentioned cases
because "no court in the Second Circuit had held that canine sniffs

Id. at 51.
Id. (internal quotations marks omitted).
Id. at 52.
See United States v. Reilly, 76 F.3d 1271,
F.2d 1359, 1368 (2d Cir. 1985).
92. 757 F.2d at 1359.
93. Id. at 1366.
94. Id. at 1368.
88.
89.
9o .
91.

1280

(2d Cir. 1996); United States v. Thomas, 757
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' Given the lack of development in the
violated the Fourth Amendment."95
law regarding canine sniffs in the Second Circuit, the officer "did not
have any significant reason to believe that what he had done was
unconstitutional. "96
In United States v. Reilly, Judge Guido Calabresi stated that "[g]ood
faith is not a magic lamp for police officers to rub whenever they find
themselves in trouble."' In Reilly, the court excluded evidence obtained
pursuant to a search warrant issued upon evidence that was obtained by
violating the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. Police officers
walked onto the defendant's property and viewed approximately twenty
marijuana plants, a fact that was subsequently used to obtain a search
warrant. 9s The Second Circuit found that the predicate search encroached
on the curtilage of the defendant's property and therefore violated his
Fourth Amendment rights.' The court declined to apply the good faith
exception, finding that the police officers omitted certain facts in their
application for a search warrant in a manner that was "almost calculated
to mislead" the magistrate judge."' These seemingly intentional
omissions precluded their good faith reliance on the subsequently issued
warrant.' Despite ruling that exclusion was appropriate in this case, the
court explained that "we do not [reach the question of whether] the fruit
of illegal searches can never be the basis for a search warrant that police
can subsequently use in good faith."'". It has been argued, in light of
these statements, that the Reilly opinion stands for the proposition that
the good faith exception can apply to illegal predicate searches as long as
there is full disclosure to a magistrate judge of the attendant
circumstances of the illegal search."'3 However, this interpretation of
Reilly runs contrary to another observation made by the Reilly court,
where it held that "it is one thing to admit evidence innocently obtained
by officers who rely on warrants later found invalid to magistrate
error... [, but] it is an entirely different matter when the officers are

95. United States v. McClain, 444 F.3 d 537, 544 (6th Cir. 2006) (order denying rehearing en banc)
(Martin, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 545 (quoting Reilly, 76 F.3d at 1281).
97. Reilly, 76 F.3d at i28o.
98. Id. at 1274.
99. Id. at 1279 (citing United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294,300 (1987)).
too. Id. at 128o.
toi. Id.
102. Id. at 1280-8I.
1o3. Halcom, supra note 58, at 490. This approach has been advocated by another commentator
who envisions an enlarged role of the magistrate judge in expanding the application of the good faith
exception. See Clancy, supra note 58, at 722. This concept has been criticized by the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals in United States v. Vasey, where it was held that a "magistrate's consideration of the
evidence does not sanitize the taint of the illegal warrantless search." 834 F.2d 782, 789 (9th Cir. 1987).
This would also place too much of an administrative burden on magistrates judges who already must
process a very high volume of search warrant applications. Halcom, supra note 58, at 491.
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themselves ultimately responsible for the defects in the warrant."' 4
Whatever the reasoning of the court, it did not specifically adopt a rule
that allows the good faith exception to apply to evidence seized pursuant
to a search warrant issued upon illegally obtained evidence.
4. The D.C. Circuit
It has also been argued that the District of Columbia Circuit Court
of Appeals has adopted a reading of Leon under which the good faith
exception could be applied to illegal predicate searches. 5 In United
States v. Thornton, an officer conducted a warrantless search of an
individual's trash in order to obtain evidence that was later used to
support probable cause for a search warrant. The court held that:
It was eminently reasonable for the Superior Court judge, and the
police officers, to believe that the trash bag search was constitutional
and its fruits could be used to establish probable cause, given that the
overwhelming weight of authority rejects the proposition that a
reasonable expectation of privacy exists with respect to trash discarded
outside the home and the curtilege thereof."
Although the court discussed the reasonableness of the officers'
perception of the constitutionality of the trash search, it appears that this
ruling was made upon the grounds that the superior court judge aided
the probable cause determination, and that the court expressed its own
reservations for recognizing a reasonable expectation of privacy in one's
own discarded trash. 8
5. Summary of an Expanded Application of the Good Faith
Exception
Thus far, the Eighth, and now the Sixth Circuit have extended the
good faith exception to illegal predicate searches-searches where the
illegality was premised on the officer's own mistake in honoring the
protections of the Fourth Amendment. While the Second Circuit has
arguably instituted a taint-cleansing rule by requiring disclosure of the
circumstances of the illegal search to a magistrate judge, it is clear that
illegally obtained evidence can, under some circumstances, be used to
104. Reilly, 76 F.3d at 1281. The dissent from the denial of rehearing in McClain also indicates that
Reilly does not stand for the proposition that as long as the illegal circumstances of the search are
disclosed in the application for the search warrant, the good faith exception can therefore be applied.
United States v. McClain, 444 F.3d 537, 544 (6th Cir. 2006) (order denying rehearing en banc) (Martin,
J., dissenting). Rather, the dissent argued that the key distinction is the officers' reliance on their own
assessment of the Fourth Amendment, rather than another institutional actor whose deterrence does
not invoke the exclusionary rule. Id.
Io5. Halcom, supra note 58, at 480 (citing United States v. Thornton, 746 F.2d 39 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
io6. Thornton, 746 F.2d at 49. This case occurred four years prior to the Supreme Court's ruling in
Californiav. Greenwood, which held that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in one's own
trash. 486 U.S. 35, 37 (1988).
io7. Thornton, 746 F.2d at 49.
io8. See id. at 49 & n.ii.
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obtain a search warrant.'" Also, the D.C. Circuit has held that in a
situation where a superior court judge and a police officer both believe a
search is valid based on the "overwhelming weight of authority,"
exclusion is not a proper remedy under the Leon exception."'
Underlying each of these decisions is the premise that the good faith
exception protects reasonable police conduct in borderline situations that
do not ultimately pass constitutional muster. Since exclusion arguably
would not have any deterrent effect in these situations, suppression is not
the appropriate remedy. Other circuits, however, have addressed this
issue and have come to a very different understanding of the nature of
Leon's good faith exception.
B.

AN ILLEGAL PREDICATE SEARCH PRECLUDES THE APPLICATION OF THE
GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE

i.

The Ninth Circuit

In United States v. Vasey, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
rejected the application of the good faith exception to illegal predicate
searches."' In Vasey, the defendant was pulled over for speeding, and
was subsequently arrested when a warrants check revealed an
outstanding warrant for his arrest." 2 Forty-five minutes after placing the
defendant in the back of the police vehicle, suspicious of drug related
activity, the police officers decided to impound the car and perform an
inventory search of the vehicle on the side of the road."3 The inventory
search uncovered $5000 in cash and a gold watch, after which the police
officers terminated the search and used the evidence obtained to apply
for a search warrant."4 The postwarrant search revealed $71,111 in cash
and three kilograms of cocaine. 5 The district court first granted
suppression, but later reversed its decision holding that the initial search
was a valid search incident to arrest.,6 The Ninth Circuit, however, found
that the initial search was "not conducted contemporaneously with the
arrest" and therefore the subsequent postwarrant search was made
without probable cause."I7 In so holding, the court declared that "[t]he
fact that... [the officer] conducted a warrantless search of the vehicle
which violated ... [the defendant's] Fourth Amendment rights precludes
any reliance on the good faith exception."" 8 Distinguishing Leon, the
"

IO9. Reilly, 76 F.3d at 128o-8i.
io. Thornton, 746 F.2d at 49.
111. 834 F.2d 782, 784 (9th Cir. 1987).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 785.

115. Id.
ii6. Id.
I 17. Id. at 786, 788.
ix8. Id. at 789.
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Ninth Circuit recognized that the "constitutional error was made by the
officer," not a magistrate judge, and thus was "an activity that the
exclusionary rule was meant to deter."'"9 Furthermore, the court rejected
the
notion
that
a
''magistrate's
consideration
of
the
evidence... sanitize[s] the taint of the illegal warrantless
search,"
thus
20
rejecting adoption of the rule set forth in Reilly.'
The Ninth Circuit later decided United States v. Wanless on the same
grounds. 2 ' In Wanless, highway patrol officers conducted a warrantless
investigative search of two pulled-over vehicles without probable
cause.' 2 Although the officers used the evidence uncovered to obtain a
search warrant that later uncovered more contraband, the court stated
that "the good faith exception does not apply where a search warrant is
issued on the basis of evidence obtained as the result of an illegal
search."' 23 Since the police officers were solely responsible for the Fourth
Amendment violation, the state was precluded from relying on the good
faith exception."4

The Eleventh Circuit
In United States v. McGough, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
also rejected the application of the good faith exception to illegal
predicate searches.' 2 In McGough, the circuit court reversed the lower
court for failure to suppress after it misapplied the community caretaking
exception to the warrant requirement.'2 In the case, a five-year-old girl
called the police after she was locked in her apartment by her father who
had gone out to purchase groceries.' 7 Arriving on the scene, a police
officer called the fire department to have the door pried open; however,
the defendant arrived before the door was opened. The defendant was
arrested for reckless conduct and placed in a police car with his
daughter.' 9 Although the defendant refused to allow the officers to
search his home, two officers entered the residence when they
accompanied the girl into the apartment to retrieve her shoes.'30 Once
inside the apartment, officers saw in plain view a large bag of marijuana
2.

ii9. Id.
120.

Id.

121. 882 F.2d

122.
123.

1459 (9th Cir. 1989).

Id. at 1465.
Id. at 1466 (citing Vasey, 834 F.2d at 789).

124. See
125. 412

id.
F.3 d 1232 (ilth Cir. 2005).
126. Id. at 1239; see also Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973) (excepting a search from
the warrant requirement that is "totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of
evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute").
127. McGough, 412 F.3d at 1233.
128. Id. at 1233-34.
129.

Id. at

130. Id.

1234.
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and a firearm.'31 At this point, an officer left the scene to obtain a search
warrant, and included the observations made within the home in his
affidavit.3 ' After the warrant was secured, the officers searched the
apartment and found more drugs and firearms, as well as large amounts
of cash.'33 A magistrate judge recommended that the evidence be
suppressed, but the district court judge denied suppression, and the
defendant was convicted and sentenced to i6o months in prison.'34 The
Eleventh Circuit reversed, finding that "the exigencies of the situation[defendant's daughter's] need for her shoes-are not compelling enough
to find that the officers' warrantless entry. . was objectively
reasonable."'35 The Eleventh Circuit, however, considered the argument
that the good faith exception should apply, but ruled that "it was not an
'objectively reasonable law enforcement activity' but rather the officers'
unlawful entry into McGough's apartment that led to... [the] request
for a search warrant. ', 36 The court relied on Wanless and Reilly in
holding that the good faith exception may not apply when the search
warrant was obtained on the basis of an unlawful search. 37
3. The Tenth Circuit
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals recently rejected the application
of the good faith exception to illegal predicate searches. 38 In United
States v. Herrera,a police officer pulled over the defendant in his pick-up
truck and conducted a search pursuant to a Kansas regulatory scheme
that authorized random inspection of commercial vehicles.' 39 However,
the defendant's truck was not a commercial vehicle for purposes of the
law and therefore did not fall under the regulation.'4" The Tenth Circuit
found that the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights were violated and
that the good faith exception did not apply despite the fact that the
trooper was only mistaken by one pound in his assessment of whether or
not the truck was a commercial vehicle.'4' This determination was made
in light of "the officer's mistaken good-faith factual belief.., that the
vehicle being searched was a commercial vehicle.' 42 Looking to the
instances where the Supreme Court applied the good faith exception, the
court concluded that:
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id.

Id. at

1235.

Id.
Id.

Id. at 1239.
136. Id. at 124o (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919-20 (1984)).
137. Id.
138. United States v. Herrera, 444 F.3d 1238 (Ioth Cir. 20o6).
139. Id. at 1241.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1246.
142. Id. at 1254.
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[The] application of Leon's good-faith exception to the exclusionary
rule turns to a great extent on whose mistake produces the Fourth
Amendment violation. And because the purpose underlying this goodfaith exception is to deter police conduct, logically Leon's exception
most frequently applies where the mistake was made by someone other
than the officer executing the search that violated the Fourth
Amendment.'43
The court went further, stating that "[tihis third party judgment provides
a neutral check on the officer's conduct."'" The court concluded that
"Leon's good-faith exception applies only narrowly, and ordinarily only
where an officer relies, in an objectively reasonable manner, on a
mistake made by someone other than the officer."' 4 The court did reflect
that there might be "very unusual circumstances" when the good faith
exception could apply when an officer is relying on his own error;
however, the court did not address what those circumstances were. 46
The Tenth Circuit's rule in Herrera was affirmed in a subsequent
case, United States v. Cos.47 In Cos, police officers unlawfully entered the
defendant's apartment after obtaining consent from a friend of the
defendant who was not authorized to give consent.' Upon entering the
apartment, the officers observed a shotgun under the defendant's bed, a
fact that was later used to obtain a search warrant for the household. I"'
The court of appeals found that the search violated the defendant's
Fourth Amendment rights and that the good faith exception was
inapplicable.' Applying the Herrera rule, the court concluded that for
"violations of the Fourth Amendment that are caused by the officers'
mistakes rather that [sic] by those of a third party, the good faith
exception ordinarily remains inapplicable.''. The court went on to
address McClain, holding that the "close to the line of validity" test
"conflicts with the law of this circuit."' 52
4. Summary of the Narrow Application of the Good Faith
Exception
Thus, the Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have all firmly stated
that a police officer's misconduct in securing evidence later used to
establish probable cause for a search warrant precludes the application of
the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.'53 Focusing on the actor
143.
i44.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id. at 1250.
Id. at 1253.
Id. at 1249.
Id. at 1253.

498 F.3d 1115 (10oth Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1118.
Id.
Id. at 1133.
151. Id. at 1132 n.3 (citing Herrera,444 F.3 d at 1249).
152. Id. at 1133 (citing United States v. McClain, 444 F.3d 556, 566 (6th Cir. 2006)).
153. Herrera,444 F.3d at 1255; United Stated v. McGough, 412 F.3d 1232, 1240 (iith Cir. 2005);
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that was responsible for the unlawful conduct in procuring the illegally
obtained evidence, those circuits have held that Leon is inapplicable to
good faith misconduct by police officers since they are the focus of the
deterrent goals of the exclusionary rule.
III.

HONORING THE PROTECTIONS OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND
PREVENTING INSTITUTIONAL IGNORANCE

There are two distinct camps with regards to applying the good faith
exception to illegal predicate searches. In the first camp, which includes
the Eighth, Sixth, and arguably the Second and D.C. Circuits,'54 a police
officer may rely on his own misinterpretation of the Fourth Amendment
and still receive the benefits of the good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule. These courts claim that when the infraction is "close to
the line of validity, ' '55 or when "there [was] nothing more the officer
could have or should have done ... to be sure his search would be
legal,' ' I the unlawful search was so reasonable that the deterrent
purposes of the exclusionary rule would no longer be appreciable.
Although the Supreme Court has never extended the good faith
exception to an officer's good faith reliance on his own mistaken
understanding of the constitutional line of validity under the Fourth
Amendment, these courts have held that if no appreciable deterrent
effect can be had, then exclusion is not the proper remedy under Leon.
In the other camp, which includes the Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh
Circuits,'57 there is a bright-line rule that once an officer "conduct[s] a
warrantless search" that violates an individual's Fourth Amendment
8
rights, it "precludes any reliance on the good faith exception."'
Looking to Supreme Court rulings and the nature of the deterrent
effect of the exclusionary rule, the good faith exception must not be
extended by future courts to illegal predicate searches where the
illegality is premised on the officer's mistaken understanding of the
requisite amount of suspicion they needed to conduct the search.
A.

MECHANICS OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE AND GOOD FAITH

The five situations where the Supreme Court has applied the good
faith exception to the exclusionary rule have involved a police officer
relying on a third party's error in the determination of the law under the
Fourth Amendment. In Leon, an officer relied on the erroneous

United States v. Vasey, 834 F.2d 782, 7 89-90 (9th Cir. 1987).
154.
155.
156.
157.

See supra Part II.A.I-4.
United States v. White, 890 F.2d 1413, 1419 (8th Cir. 1989).
United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359, 1368 (2d Cir. 1985).
See supra Part II.B.I-3.

158. Vasey, 834 F.2d at 789.
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probable cause determination by a magistrate judge.'59 In Sheppard, a
police officer similarly relied on a magistrate judge's insistence that a
particular warrant application form did not invalidate the search
warrant. ' In Krull, an officer relied on a state search statute that was
later declared unconstitutional, an error made by the Illinois
legislature.' 6 ' In Evans, an officer relied in good faith on a computer
record maintained by the judicial branch of Arizona that erroneously
indicated the defendant had an outstanding warrant. ' Finally, in
Herring, a police officer relied on a police clerk's negligently provided
information that a suspect had an outstanding warrant for his arrest
when in fact that warrant had been recalled.' In Herring, the Court
acknowledged that suppression should be granted "'only if it can be said
that the law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly be
charged with knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional under the
Fourth Amendment.'" 64 In assessing the culpability of an officer in
committing the Fourth Amendment violation - a necessary analysis in
determining whether or not the exclusionary rule should be applied-the
officer's action must be found to be "deliberate, reckless, or grossly
negligent. ' ' 6, In addition, although normally not considered a good faith
case, Groh arguably stands for the proposition that good faith may not
be invoked when it is a police officer that is at fault for the Fourth
Amendment transgression.
If future courts extend the good faith exception to illegal predicate
searches, as the Eighth, Sixth, and arguably the Second and D.C. Circuits
have done, they will depart dramatically from Leon and its progeny.
When an illegal predicate search occurs, a police officer violates an
individual's rights under the Fourth Amendment because of his own
misapplication of the law. The individual making the error is the police
officer, the very person whose conduct the exclusionary rule is aimed at
deterring. This departs from prior good faith jurisprudence because the
mistake is committed by the very person who has a vested interest in
transgressing the Fourth Amendment rights of the citizenry. Police
officers have a different stake and role in law enforcement than do
judges, legislatures, and clerical employees of the state. The recognition
that police are engaged in the "competitive enterprise of ferreting out
crime" should indicate that police officers lack the sagacity to make

159. 468 U.S. 897, 900 (1984).
16o. 468 U.S. 981, 99o-91 (1984).

I6I.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

480 U.S. 340, 343 (1986).
514 U.S. 1, 4 (1995).
129 S.Ct. 695, 698 (2009).
Id. at 701-02 (quoting Krull, 480 U.S. at 348-49).
Id. at 702.
See supra notes 50-55 and accompanying text.
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reasoned determinations of the correct application of the Fourth
Amendment.' 67 Although police officers in many circumstances may
believe that they are complying with the Fourth Amendment, especially
in close cases, it does not follow that their determination must be given
the benefit of the doubt so as to deny the most meaningful deterrent for
Fourth Amendment violations-the exclusionary rule. In fact, the law
should provide mechanisms to encourage police officers engaged in this
competitive enterprise to err on the side of caution when potentially
violating an individual's fundamental rights. Failing to exclude evidence6
illegally obtained, even though it was "close to the line of validity,"'
encourages police misconduct in the future. This disregards the Supreme
Court's clear directive in Leon that where there is police misconduct that
violates the Fourth Amendment to be deterred,69and that deterrence is
meaningful, then exclusion is the proper remedy.'
Judge Martin put it best when he stated that the Fourth Amendment
has "more holes in it than a piece of Swiss cheese.' ' 7 It is true that the
line at which police conduct violates our Fourth Amendment rights is not
clear. Although the law is applied uniformly by the Supreme Court, there
are difficult determinations and exceptions that make its application on
the streets difficult for police officers. To apply the good faith exception
in situations where the police have erred will derogate those reasonable
expectations of privacy afforded by the Fourth Amendment, and create a
gray area where our rights are not clear but rather are interpreted by
arresting and searching officers. Most importantly, failure to suppress
evidence unlawfully obtained in these situations encourages institutional
ignorance of people's Fourth Amendment rights. It is unacceptable to
place the power to define our rights in the hands of the very individuals
who are most likely to want to violate those rights. It is ironic that the
Eighth Circuit has found that when a violation is "close to the line of
validity" it pushes the case into the "gray area created by Leon,"'7' when
in fact it is the court blurring the lines of Leon's application, and
ultimately our rights under the Fourth Amendment.
A BRIEF CASE STUDY
The justification for extending the good faith exception to illegal
predicate searches is that suppression would not serve its deterrent
purpose because the actions of the police officers were objectively
B.

THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT:

167. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. io,14 (948).
168. United States v. McClain, 444 F.3d 556, 566 (6th Cir. 2oo6); United States v. White, 890 F.2d
143, 1419 (8th Cir. 1989).
169. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 99 (1984).
170. United States v. McClain, 444 F.3d 537, 537 (6th Cir. 2oo6) (order denying rehearing en banc)
(Martin, J., dissenting).
171. White, 89o F.2d at 1419.
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reasonable. To suppress would in no way serve to alter future conduct of
police officers and, therefore, no advantage would be gained by
excluding the evidence. When the infraction is "so close to the line of
validity," and there is nothing more that a police officer may do to ensure
that their conduct comports with the Fourth Amendment, what future
misconduct would change through suppression of evidence? Looking to
the good faith jurisprudence of the Eighth Circuit alone, however, where
this line of reasoning originated, it is clear that the same police
misconduct occurs over and over again because of a failure to apply the
proper remedy. Not coincidentally, in all three Eighth Circuit cases that
have applied the good faith exception,"' police officers violated the
defendants' rights by seizing luggage at airports without the requisite
amount of articulable suspicion." Both Kiser and Fletcher followed the
rule in White, and it appears that the police forces in those cases did
nothing to change their practices in airports in order to comport with the
law. This shows that the "close to the line of validity" test espoused in
White encourages institutional ignorance of the true line of validity of
articulable suspicion in airports.'74 Although individually, each case
represented police officers' good faith belief that they were comporting
with the Fourth Amendment requirements, it is clear that the failure to
suppress in White had a demonstrable effect, or lack thereof, on the
activities by future officers in future cases. As Jerold Israel explained, the
deterrent purposes of exclusion must be played out in the training
programs for police departments.' 5 Without exclusion, there is no reason
for police departments and their officers to change their practices of
violating the law. Therefore, extension of the good faith exception to
illegal predicate searches institutionally memorializes police officers'
mistakes. Moreover, these mistakes involve a constitutional violation of a
right that has been deemed fundamental by the Supreme Court, a
situation that is unacceptable.
C.

SCIENTER: THE HERRING AND FRANKS FRAMEWORK

The Supreme Court recently clarified the scope of the good faith
exception in Herring v. United States, and thus future good faith
arguments will have to conform to its analysis. Chief Justice Roberts'
172. See supra Part II.A.2.

173. See supra Part II.A.2.
174. In Kiser, the search occurred on May 6, i98o in Chicago's O'Hare Airport. 948 F.2d 418, 421
(8th Cir. i91). In White, the illegal search occurred on March 14, 1988 in Lambert International
Airport in St Louis. 890 F.2d at 1414. Finally, in Fletcher, the illegal search occurred on July 7, 1995 at
the Des Moines airport. 91 F.3d 48, 49 (8th Cir. 1996). Failure to suppress in both Kiser and White
condoned the type of police misconduct that ultimately led to the violation of Mr. Fletcher's Fourth
Amendment rights. Looking to all of these cases, where all three searches bear striking resemblance to
each other, it can be argued that failure to suppress evidence led to persistent illegal police activity.
175. Israel, supra note 31, at 1412-13.
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opinion seemingly establishes a scienter requirement when evaluating6
whether the police violation is egregious enough to trigger exclusion. ,
Much like the Court's analysis in Delaware v. Franks,'77 the Court
determined that mere "negligence or innocent mistake" would not
suffice to warrant exclusion.17 Chief Justice Roberts explained that
exclusion is meant to "deter deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent
conduct, or in some circumstances recurring or systemic negligence."' 79
The question must then be asked: Can a police officer's
misapplication of the law when deciding to conduct a search be
considered negligent? In Franks and Herring, the police were guilty of
negligently supplying incorrect information that led to an illegal search.
In Franks, a police officer negligently supplied misinformation in his
affidavit,'" and in Herring a police clerk gave false information because
of a mistake in the local warrant recording procedure."' Can this scienter
requirement be applied to a negligently conducted illegal search? Surely
this would discourage effective police training programs, a chief concern
expressed by the Court in Leon. ' Likewise, from the perspective of the
judiciary, can judges ever view a police officer's failure to know the true
line of validity as mere negligence? As explained in Leon, "officers
[must] have a reasonable knowledge of what the law prohibits."'8'
Lower courts applying Herring will have to decide whether or not
the scienter requirement applies equally to police officers' own mistakes
in honoring the protections of the Fourth Amendment. As argued above,
in order to comport with the protections of the exclusionary rule and
previous good faith jurisprudence, suppression must be granted in cases
of illegal predicate searches.' Therefore, courts should either relegate
the Herring scienter requirement to police provision of misinformation
that leads to an illegal search, or they should rule that illegal predicate
searches are per se reckless or grossly negligent. Then again, given the
widespread concern that Herring has jeopardized the existence of the
exclusionary rule,' 5 it could be the first case of several that further clarify
the application of the exclusionary rule in good faith cases. In the
176. Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 702 (2009) ("To trigger the exclusionary rule, police
conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently
culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system. As laid out in our cases, the
exclusionary rule serves to deter deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in some
circumstances recurring or systemic negligence.").
177. 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978).
178. Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 703.
179. Id. at 702.

s8o. See 438 U.S. at 157-58.
181. 12 9 S. Ct. at 704.
182. 468 U.S. 897, 919-2o n.20 (1984) (citing Israel, supra note 35, at 1412-13).

183. Id. (citing United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 542 (1975)).
184. See supra Part III.A-B.
185. See sources cited supra note 2.
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meantime, however, courts should safeguard the application of the
exclusionary remedy to illegal predicate searches, lest the exception
swallow the rule.
CONCLUSION

There is a dramatic split in the circuit courts concerning the
application of the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. Once a
rule that was limited only to an officer's reliance on third party actors
with no personal stake in law enforcement, the reach of the exception
has moved unlawful police conduct with no such reliance beyond the
grasp of the exclusionary rule. The Fourth Amendment has experienced
a disjointed application in the last sixty years from the high Court, and
therefore it is not quite clear when it protects individuals under suspicion
by police officers. It is difficult to apply in courtrooms by educated
lawyers and judges, let alone by police officers zealously enforcing the
law in the field. Although we cannot assume that police officers
purposefully violate the Fourth Amendment, it is important that we
check the immense power that we grant officers by requiring a narrow
reading of the good faith exception. Officers must err on the side of
caution when presented with situations where our fundamental rights are
at stake. To hold otherwise would create a judicial mechanism that would
literally encourage institutional ignorance of the true line of protection
afforded by the Fourth Amendment. This undesirable situation exists
today in various areas of the country under jurisdiction of the Eighth and
Sixth Circuits, and perhaps in the Second and D.C. Circuits. Thus, courts
must not defer to police officers' interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment when conducting searches, and must not allow the good
faith exception to the exclusionary rule to extend to illegal predicate
searches.
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